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KYOTO AND EMISSIONS TRADING:
CHALLENGES FOR THE NAFTA FAMILY
t

Robert Page

INTRODUCTION
North Americans are facing serious challenges today in managing our
common energy and environmental resources. With the Middle East and
Afghanistan in the spotlight, public attention has been diverted from pressing
domestic issues closer to home. These include energy supply and security,
new technologies to deal with air emission issues, transmission constraints in
moving electricity, pipelines for Alaskan gas to the lower 48 states, climate
change, and the role of renewables to complement fossil fuels. The list is
substantial and growing. Market forces and government priorities are driving
North American integration. But we have some differences and caution
flags. On climate change, we are currently headed down different and
potentially conflicting courses. Canada currently is committed to ratifying
the Kyoto Protocol,1 while Washington has rejected it.2 For our company,
operating in both countries, these conflicting policy frameworks create
economic risks and political dangers. Before policy options are finalized, we
need to seek maximum levels of compatibility between the two systems for
the benefit of both Canadian producers and U.S. consumers.
In approaching this challenge, we have to be mindful of history. While
we are each other's best customers, we do not always nurture bilateral trade
flows. In the Age of NAFTA and globalization, protectionism has found
new forms. Canadian-American relations are unique, complex, and multilayered. Our economics are now so intertwined; domestic and foreign
relations are very difficult to separate. Given the scale and the sensitivity of
Vice President for Sustainable Development, TransAlta Utilities Corporation, Calgary,
Alberta. B.A., M.A., Queen's University; Ph.D., Oxford University. Additional biographical
information available at page xvi.
1 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N.
Doc. FCCCICPI1997I71Add.2, 37 I.L.M. 32 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; Dennis
Bueckert, Canada Will Ratify Kyoto, PM Tells Business, EDMONTON J., Nov. 3, 2001, at A5
(relorting that Chrdtien intends to ratify Kyoto in 2002).
President George W. Bush, Remarks Discussing Global Climate Change (June 11, 2001)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html).
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our relations, they require constant attention and nurturing. Today we
cooperate on steel and autos 3 while we fight on agriculture and forest
products.4 Given the importance of energy flows and its links to climate
change, we cannot afford to fight on Kyoto-related issues.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 5 was a very
important step forward in promoting economic cooperation and prosperity.
However, both our countries have entrenched domestic lobbies working to
subvert NAFTA's spirit and intent. Often we assume too much and we
dialogue too little. While we have dispute settlement panels under NAFTA,
they are not exempt from political override, especially by the stronger
partner. Kyoto, unless adequately addressed, has the potential to trigger
similar disputes and dislocations of product flows. On environmental issues,
we have had both successes and failures. Acid rain took years to manage,
and it is still an issue in the Great Lakes area. As our partnership evolves and
matures, we must develop the political will and the institutional means to
address irritants before they become structural problems. Quite simply, we
need a NAFTA approach to climate change if continental energy cooperation
is to proceed as all three countries wish.
TRANSALTA AND NAFTA
TransAlta is one of the new "NAFTA-style" companies operating in all
three countries. Managing our environmental control costs is an important
component to our competitiveness. We are currently spending over US$300
million to improve the emission controls on our thermal power plant at
Centralia in Washington State. Some of our competitors in adjoining states
face less rigorous emission requirements. In Alberta we face costly CO 2
offset regulations for new thermal power plants from 2005.6 Jurisdictional
differences between Canada and the United States and between U.S. states
translate into cost differentials and competitive risks in a nonlevel playing
field.7
3 See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Automotive Products, U.S.-Can., Jan. 16, 1965, C.T.S.
1966/14.
4 Our fight on forest products deals mostly with softwood lumber. See British Columbia
Ministry of Forests: Softwood Lumber Dispute, at http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/HET/Softwood/
(July 18, 2002).
5 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993).
6 See David Sands, Alberta Eyes New Rules for Old Plants, EDMONTON SUN, Nov. 14,
2001, at 14, availableat http://www.web.ca/-aen/news/news0l 1112/eg-novl2a.txt.
7 Six New England states and five provinces of Eastern Canada recently signed a pact to
reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. The signatories pledged to cut emissions to 1990 levels by
2010 and by 10 percent below that level by 2020. Gary Polakavic, U.S. Cities, States Taking
Lead In Reducing Global Warming, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at A 13, availableat 2001
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While our policy frameworks may be different, we need to maximize
common features for compatibility. North American energy producers face
tough competition from non-Kyoto OPEC oil or gas producers. Americans
often forget the importance of Canadian suppliers to the American domestic
market. Canada is one of the U.S.' largest import supplier of oil and its
principal supplier of natural gas. 8 The companies that mine the oil sands of
northern Alberta hope to triple their output to 2 million barrels a day within
the decade. 9 But this and other investments are dependent upon corporations
being able to manage their Kyoto and other production costs so they can
continue to be competitive.
TransAlta's Approach to Climate Change
Over the past decade, our company has worked to develop its climate
change plan as part of its wider business strategy. We accept that our
countries are headed for a carbon-constrained future, whether our countries
operate within or outside Kyoto. There are three components in our plan:
1. Managing the substantial financial and regulatory risks.
2. Through technology and offsets seek out cost effective greenhouse
gas (GHG) solutions.
3. Develop new business opportunities related to carbon regimes and
renewables.
We begin with continuous improvement and innovation with our existing
generating plants and enhanced environmental management procedures to
increase efficiency and lower emissions. We have also developed GHG
offset projects (outside our own plants) to capture carbon or avoid its
emissions into the atmosphere. We claim credits from these projects to offset
the existing plant emissions. Such projects include landfill or coalmine

WL 3523399. California is currently attempting to pass an initiative to regulate the emission
of greenhouse gases from automobiles, but is facing stiff resistance from labor unions and auto
manufacturers. Miguel Bustillo, Exhaust Regulation May Hit a Red Light, L.A. TIMES, May
21, 2002, at Al, availableat 2002 WL 2477255.
8 The U.S. receives 93% of its natural gas imports from Canada. Canada ranks third,
behind Saudi Arabia and Mexico, in crude oil imports. Country Analysis Brief- Canada, at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/canada.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
9 Suncor Energy, the world's largest producer of crude oil from oil sands, currently
produces about 200,000 barrels per day. Recently, it announced a major capital investment in
an attempt to more than double its current capacity. See Kevin Nabholz, Suncor Energy's
Approach to Major Capital Projects, Remarks Before the Alberta Buyer-Seller Forum (Mar.
14, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.cme-mec.ca/ab/bsf2002/suncor.htm). It is likely
that other companies will follow Suncor's lead.
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methane capture, forest or agricultural soil sinks,' 0 and wind and other
renewable energy projects. Some of these are at home in North America,
while others are prospective Joint Implementation (JI)" or Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in Latin America, Africa, and
which is
Asia. We have also been active in GHG emissions credit trading,
12
authorized to be a market mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol.
While the above are short- and medium-term actions, our long-term goal
is fundamental technology change and capital stock renewal of existing
plants. We propose to achieve this through the design, development, testing,
and application of new coal combustion technology to capture and
permanently sequester underground our thermal power plant emissions. The
potential GHG and other emissions which are contained in our coal we
propose to recycle back underground. The CO 2 is converted from a costly
waste into an economic product capable of being sold to enhance oil
production in mature oilfields. While we plan to test this new combustion
technology during the first Kyoto commitment period (2008-2012), the
application of this technology to our existing plants would be post-2012. We
are virtually eliminating CO 2 emissions. 13 While this new technology will be
expensive to develop, coal as a fuel has very significant price advantages
over the alternative fuel, which is natural gas. Also, we own several hundred
years' coal supply adjacent to our plants.
WHY EMISSIONS TRADING?
In the last decade, the most important addition to the environmental
toolbox has been the development of market mechanisms to deliver
environmental goals, including emissions trading and other market-based
tools. Emissions trading seeks to create flexibility and least-cost options for
corporate managers, while delivering real and measurable environmental
goals for society. It is taking the lessons of market economics and financing
and applying them to the environment. Emissions trading began over a
'0 A "sink" is defined by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
May 9, 1992, art. 1(8), 31 I.L.M. 849, 854 [hereinafter Convention], as "any process, activity
or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas
from the atmosphere."
11 "Joint implementation" is whereby governments and industries support greenhouse gas
mitigation in other countries. TRANSALTA UTILITIES CORPORATION, TRANSALTA'S ACTION
PLAN IN SUPPORT OF CANADA'S CLIMATE CHANGE VOLUNTARY CHALLENGE AND REGISTRY

PROGRAM 12 (1995), available at http://www.transalta.com.
12

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 16 bis, 37 I.L.M. at 40.

13 See TRANSALTA UTILITIES CORPORATION, BEYOND KYOTO: TRANSALTA'S BLUEPRINT

FOR SUSTAINABLE THERMAL POWER GENERATION
com.

1 (2000), available at http://www.transalta.
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14
decade ago with the U.S. Clear Air Act provisions for SO 2 and NOx trading.
Through a cap-and-trade system, companies who have cut emissions below
their targets will have credits that they can sell to those who have not yet met
their targets. This creates a financial incentive to go beyond compliance.
The results of this system showed greater emission cuts at lower costs than
originally predicted. This created an important new "market mechanism" as
an alternative to regulation and taxation.
The scientific foundation for GHG emission trading is as important as its
economic basis. Emission trading is based upon the global nature of the
GHG phenomenon in the atmosphere and the nature of carbon regimes. CO 2
is a long term phenomenon; on average, it remains in the atmosphere about
one century.' 5 CO 2 is a product of human respiration and an essential food
for plant life. It is not as toxic as some other emissions. The key issue is the
CO2 remaining in the atmosphere, not just the total emissions, as some of
which are absorbed by natural systems (forestry, soils, oceans, etc.). So the
basis of our calculations should be net emissions, not gross emissions. If a
company is financing carbon capture projects, it should be allowed to credit
those amounts (when verified) against its emissions. We are developing
scientific verification procedures to measure and to document offset projects.
Carbon regimes in the atmosphere are like a bank account with deposits
(emissions) and withdrawals (offset projects). The net figure constitutes the
contribution to global climate change.
Emissions trading seeks to find the least-cost verified credits from
emission cuts or offset sources. This allows companies to manage their
compliance costs and the timing of investments in new technology more
efficiently.
Credits may be currently cheaper than purchasing new
technology, but given enough time, technology usually becomes the desired
option. By lowering compliance costs for industry and for the economy, this
helps to facilitate jobs, competitiveness, and capital stock renewal. This is a
win/win situation that simultaneously meets the needs of business and the
environment. It also brings the potential for new private-sector climate
change investment and development projects to capital-starved areas of the
developing world through credits created under the Kyoto CDM process.
We are creating carbon as new international currency and as a second
revenue stream for some climate-friendly projects. This is a whole new
dimension of market capitalism that reflects the principles of sustainable
development and the urgent need for environmental and ecological progress.
While trading remains essentially a private-sector activity, it still requires
policy and infrastructure to function well and to gain public credibility. The

14 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, § 403(c), 42 U.S.C. 765 1a(c) (West 2002).
15 See Fact Sheet: Common Sense on Climate Change, at http://www.ucsusa.org/

environment/solutions.html (last visited June 18, 2002).
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product must be registered, verified, and have defined value for market
players. The product must have scientific certainty. The credits need to be
linked to national inventories and industry or government GHG targets. It
must go through a series of steps: first, the credit is generated by or for the
seller; second, the credit is registered and verified by a third party; then, the
credit is offered for sale, and a buyer in need of a credit to meet an obligation
bids into the market. The process is facilitated by brokers who make the
trades for a fee. When the buyer has completed the transaction, the credit is
registered to meet a voluntary or a regulated obligation. Britain and
Denmark already have CO 2 emission trading regimes in operation, and many
other countries, including Canada, are at a planning stage. The EU, which
was initially very cautious about emissions trading, has now adopted this
approach, given its economic and environmental advantages. The EU is also
attempting to create an umbrella trading scheme to link the individual
national regimes of its members. It is essential that we have consistency
between these national initiatives if a proper international trading mechanism
is to emerge. As an interim step, regional trading regimes will probably be
created.
What do we need for emissions trading?
Figure 1.
Offsets

C M

Il

Sinks

Cuts

Renewables

Credits

Emissions Trading

New Technology
Financing

Regulatory
Obligations or
Voluntary Targets

Environmental
Progress to Climate
Change Targets

The North American Scene
With the split over Kyoto, the greatest challenges in consistency and
fungibility will be faced here in North America. At this point, it is assumed
that Canada will ratify the Kyoto Protocol sometime in late 2002 or early in
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2003.16 However, there may be some special features of Canadian
ratification, given the opposition of some western provinces. 17 I think it is
also safe to assume the U.S. will not ratify Kyoto within the foreseeable
future (before the second commitment period of 2013-17). The Bush
Administration will focus on a domestic plan with links to NAFTA or the
Americas. They may also develop bilateral climate change agreements
elsewhere where it is in their interest. Mexico, the third NAFTA party, has
already ratified Kyoto. 18 However, Mexico has no emission reduction
requirements,' 9 although it may adopt some voluntary targets.
It is clear that the three NAFTA members will be adopting differing
approaches to climate change and GHG emissions. This scene presents
serious challenges to government and business. The Bush Administration
policy of North American energy integration will now be more difficult. It
will increase emission-related costs of production for Canadian-based oil and
gas companies and weaken their competitive position in the U.S. market with
rival OPEC producers who have no Kyoto constraints. Given that Canada is
one of the largest suppliers of oil and the principal supplier of natural gas,
this change will weaken American energy security and increase dependence
on OPEC and the Middle East. The full significance of the energy transfers
from Canada in oil, gas, and electricity are large and growing. This is shown
in the following maps:

16 See Bueckert, supra note 1.
17 E.g., Canada Briefs, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Mar. 17, 2002, at 6, available at 2002 WL

17130620.
18 Mexico ratified the Protocol on Sept. 7, 2000.

See Kyoto Protocol: Status of
Ratification,at http://unfccc.int/resource/kpstats.pdf (June 17, 2002).
19 This is because Mexico is not an Annex I country, according to the list provided in the
Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note I, at Annex I.
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Figure 2. International and Interprovincial Transfers of Energy (gigawatthours)

iource: NATIONAL

ENERGY BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2001 TO PARLIAMENT 23 (2001).

Figure 3. Crude Oil and Equivalent Supply and Disposition (thousand cubic
metres per day)
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From Figures 2 and 3, you can see the growing role of Canadian energy in
fueling the American economy. Canada exports south nearly 1.4 million
barrels of oil per day,2° which is worth CAN$15.6 billion over the year. We
exported nearly 3,837 billion cubic feet of natural gas, worth CAN$26 billion
in 2001.21 In electricity, we exported 38.4 terawatts, worth CAN$4.2 billion,
mainly from hydro capacity in Quebec, Manitoba, and British Columbia.22
This volume was over 20% lower than the previous year due to drought and
low water conditions. In 2001, the total oil, gas, and electricity exports were
worth about CAN$46 billion.
ENERGY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The Kyoto issue emerges at a time when trade relations within NAFTA
exhibit significant tensions in other directions. In the forest products area,
differing ownership and environmental regimes have contributed to the major
softwood lumber disputes between the U.S. and Canada. Externally, the U.S.
is already facing threats of trade action over its Kyoto stand from the EU
Environmental Commissioner 3 . Some U.S. companies like Exxon have
faced consumer boycotts over their policy on climate change.24 If the Kyoto
Protocol comes into force following sufficient ratifications in 2002 or 2003,
these pressures could increase, given the intensity of feeling in the EU on this
issue. The WTO is not well equipped to handle the types of disputes where
trade protectionism and environmental goals overlap. There is a strong belief
in some EU offices that the U.S. rejected Kyoto to enhance its export
competitiveness, and they are determined to make the U.S. pay for its
environmental shortcomings.
A current irritant for Canada on Kyoto is that its energy exports are
contributing to lower GHG emissions in the U.S., while Canada, under
Kyoto, will have to accept the increased emissions from production and
transportation. Canadian natural gas and hydro exports ease the need for
coal-fired electricity generation. Canada has requested "Clean Energy
Export Credits" for these transfer§. The EU has formally rejected proposal as
20
21

See Total Crude Oil Exports, at http://www.neb.gc.ca/stats/oil/crude2.pm (Apr. 2002).
The U.S. imported 106.29 billion m3 of natural gas in 2001, resulting in Canadian

revenues of CAN$24.9 billion. See Natural Gas Exports by Term, at http://www.neb.gc.ca/
stats/expgas/gas02.prn (July 2002).
22 See NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, ELECTRICITY EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, MONTHLY
STATISTICS FOR DECEMBER 2001 15 (2002), at http://www.neb.gc.ca/stats/elec/elx0l 12_e.pdf

(noting totals on table 3A, p. 3).
23 See Pressure Mounts on U.S. Over Kyoto, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/
americas/newsid_1252000/1252556.stm (Mar. 31, 2001).
24 See, e.g., Roddick Urges Esso Boycott, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 18, 2001, at
P23, available at 2001 WL 25845698.
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a ploy to re-open the Kyoto agreement after Canada had already received
generous concessions on offsets and sinks. In the U.S., there is no incentive
for considering the Canadian proposal. Also, as long as the U.S. is outside
Kyoto and Canada within, U.S. credits would have no recognition within the
Kyoto regime. Ottawa is being pressed very strongly on this by Alberta and
the petroleum industry.
The International Scene Today
Today, the EU is in the process of ratifying Kyoto, and will likely be
followed by Russia and Japan. Kyoto will come into force when 55
countries representing 55% of the emissions of industrialized countries have
ratified the Protocol. 25 The U.S., with 25% of global emissions, is a huge
gap in the global regime.26 Only Australia appears to be joining the U.S.
position. 27 At this time, Canada may not ratify, but the Prime Minister
continues to emphasize intent to ratify. But the question is, how soon?
Canada and Australia, with about 5% of total emissions, are not a significant
in Kyoto coming into force.28
Following ratification, the Kyoto nations face a very difficult challenge in
devising the national implementation plans to meet the Kyoto targets. 29
Privately, some European officials express their doubts, especially given
current trends in transportation and thermal electricity. In a recent trip to
Europe, I saw a huge increase in interest in international emissions trading as
a means to cover emerging gaps in the progress towards Kyoto targets.
While there is no consensus on structures and process, there is a general
consensus on the need for such a system. Developing consistent rules
between the different national systems is an urgent emerging issue. Also,
both the EU countries and Canada are seeking to purchase a reserve pool of
credits from Eastern Europe and Russia to help to ensure compliance. There
will also be private sector links between Kyoto and U.S. emissions trading.
American multinational companies producing GHGs in Europe will require
Kyoto credits, and European companies producing in the U.S. will require

25 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 26, art. 24(1).

26 For the purposes of the Protocol goals, the U.S. has a 36.1% share in GHG emissions.
Kyoto Protocol: Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions of Annex I Parties in 1990, For the
Purposes of Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol, at http://unfccc.int/resource/kpco2.pdf

[hereinafter Kyoto Targets].

27 Australia Gives Up on Kyoto, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-

pacific/1279321.stm (Apr. 15, 2001).
28 Kyoto Targets, supra note 26.
29 See Phillip H. Gordon & James M. Lindsay, Beyond Kyoto, FIN.
available at http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/gordon/20010618.htm.

TIMES,

June 18, 2001,
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U.S. credits. It is inevitable that the private sector will devise the means to
trade credits between the Kyoto and the non-Kyoto world.
The North American Scene Today
Our company faces a number of challenges in operating in North
America. Having rejected Kyoto, the U.S. will proceed to develop a
domestic climate change program on a voluntary or regulated basis. The
climate change program will be linked to the wider air emissions regulations
involving S02, NOx and mercury. The Jeffords bill in the Senate
Environment Committee calls for mandatory CO 2 cuts, 30 while President
Bush's "Clear Skies" proposal is a voluntary program. 3' Both proposals
would regulate the other three pollutants, but with differing targets and
schedules. The Bush CO 2 proposals are for cuts in emissions intensity, which
would mean emissions would increase with economic growth but the
emission rate per unit of production would decline. 32 Both proposals allow
for emissions trading under a cap-and-trade system. In this period leading up
to the November elections, the debates in Congress will be intensely partisan
and legislation is unlikely to be passed. The November elections may decide
whether CO 2 is under voluntary to mandatory controls. At the state level,
significant CO2 action is emerging in a number of areas as seen on the
enclosed map.
During 2002, Canada has experienced a vigorous public debate on Kyoto
ratification and climate change policy. The Chrdtien Liberal cabinet, while
remaining committed to ratifying Kyoto, has faced increasing challenges
from the western provinces led by Alberta, the home of Canada's oil and gas
industry. While the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction for foreign
affairs, the provinces have jurisdiction over key areas like resources and land
and are thus central to Kyoto's implementation. After four years of talk,
Canada is moving towards policy decisions. In a few weeks, the federal
authorities will release their plan, which will be in a Kyoto context, while
Alberta will launch an alternative non-Kyoto plan.
At this point, it is difficult to determine what the final product will be.
However, certain themes will have to be addressed.
Offsets, sinks,
renewables, credits, and emissions trading will be included. There will be an
important technology focus for thermal electricity and petroleum. There will
30 Clean Power Act of 2001, S. 556, § 2, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1 07 cong-bills&docid=f:s556is.txt.pdf
[hereinafter Jeffords Bill] (reduces CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels).
31 See Executive Summary: The Clear Skies Initiative, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/02/clearskies.html (Feb. 14, 2002).

32

Id.
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also be an attempt to build bridges between the Kyoto and the non-Kyoto
policies across the Canada-U.S. border. Environmental considerations draw
Canada towards Kyoto, while economics draws Canada away.
CONCLUSIONS
Canadian/American relations are unique, complex, and ever-shifting.
They require more attention than either country currently gives. Canada has
a built-in sensitivity about being slighted, while the U.S. with its super power
status has more important areas for its foreign policy attention. The U.S. is
essential to Canadian interests, accounting for 40% of the Canadian GDP and
85% of exports. While there is a growing U.S. dependence on Canadian oil,
gas, and electricity, there is also the perception that Canada is not essential to
U.S. needs. The divisions between Canada and the U.S. have widened since
the election of President Bush, and Kyoto is just one of the reasons.
While Kyoto is usually perceived as an environmental issue, in reality it is
more an economic consideration - the economic costs of production and
competitiveness. Both countries are moving towards a carbon-constrained
future, but along different paths. With all the debate about Kyoto, we have
tended to ignore the potential for regional cooperation. Because carbon is so
central to our fossil fuel-based economy, it is critical for North American
business to achieve compatibility in climate policies so energy flows are not
distorted. While the simplest solution would be for Canada to abandon
Kyoto or the U.S. to join it, neither is likely to happen. So it is imperative to
find common approaches wherever possible. Here are some suggestions:
1.

2.

3.
4.

Common policy and rules for CO 2 offset projects and sinks - where
North America has a comparative advantage with our vast forests and
agricultural lands.
Common rules and definitions for emissions credits and trading,
building on the U.S. experience for SO 2 and NOx, with the goal of
creating a NAFIA emissions trading system.
NAFTA agreement with countries in the developing world for
climate change projects and credits creation.
Joint Climate Change Energy Technology cooperation to make North
America the world leader in renewables, clean coal, and other areas.

Climate change is both a business risk and a business opportunity; let us
work together to maximize the latter.

